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STATE OF UTAH, 
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RICHARD JEREMY MATTINSON, 
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Case No. 20030474-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT1 
I. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS OVERBROAD AND 
THEREFORE FACIALLY INVALID BECAUSE IT PROSCRIBES 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH. 
B. THE NORMS DECISION IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE 
THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. 
SULLIVAN DOES NOT APPLY TO CRIMINAL STATUTES. 
This Court previously held in State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, that Utah Code 
Ann. §76-10-1801 is constitutional, rejecting challenges to its vagueness and overbreadth. 
There is some overlap of arguments herein involving the overbreadth and 
vagueness of §76-10-1801. See, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) ("We 
have traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar 
doctrines."); see also, Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional 
Law §§20.9 at 274 (3 ed. 1999) ("The problem of vagueness in statutes regulating speech 
activities is based on the same rationale as the overbreadth doctrine and the Supreme 
Court often speaks of them together."). 
Id. at Tffl 8-16.2 Accordingly, the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis generally requires the 
panels of this Court to follow the decisions of all other panels. See, e.g., Bonneville 
Asphault v. Labor Com }n, 2004 UT App. 137, \ 16, 91 P.3d 849. However, that doctrine 
does not apply if the Court is persuaded that the previous decision is clearly erroneous. 
See, e.g., Manning v. State, 89 P.3d 196 (Utah App. 2004). 
The Norris decision is clearly erroneous because this Court's reliance on New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) was a misapplication of the law as applied to 
the constitutionality of criminal statutes that seek to regulate speech. Thus, this Court and 
the state in its brief3 misapplied the facts of this case to the narrow legal standard 
established in Sullivan and disregarded a large body of United States Supreme Court 
decisions in support of a finding that the communications fraud statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 
U.S. 496, 511 (1991 ) ("We have used the term actual malice as a shorthand to describe 
the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation."); Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, Inc., All U.S. 50, 67 (1976). 
Norris stands for, and the state also takes the position, that any falsehood made 
2Portions of this section are attributable to Elizabeth Hunt, attorney for Richard 
Norris in Case No. 20030817-CA, who previously briefed the impact of the Norris 
decision on the issue of constitutionality. 
3
 All of the cases cited by the state are relevant to civil actions for defamation and 
thus irrelevant to a criminal statute that proscribes speech. Moreover, the state cites no 
authority supportive of its position in the context of a criminal statute. Brief of Appellee, 
at 7-13. 
? 
with a reckless disregard for the truth for the purpose of obtaining anything of value from 
another, is not protected by the First Amendment, and is therefore subject to criminal 
sanctions under the Utah communications fraud statute. This is a stunning proposition in 
and of itself. "My dog ate my homework," is a second degree felony. So is, "Of course 
you don't look fat in that dress." First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of a 
criminal statute does not accord with this unique and unconstitutional point of view. 
In Sullivan, which does not apply to a criminal statute regulating speech, the 
Court held that for a defendant to be civilly liable to a plaintiff for libel, (1) the plaintiff 
must be a public figure; (2) the statements at issue must be defamatory in that they are 
injurious to the plaintiffs reputation; and (3) the statements were made with actual malice, 
or with at least a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. These facts are inapposite to the facts 
in this case where the ultimate issue is criminal rather than civil liability. Yet even 
contrary to this incorrectly applied civil standard, §76-10-1801 requires no harm or intent 
to harm, despite the fact that the defendant's weightier liberty interests are at stake.4 There 
is no need to prove that statements are defamatory. There is no requirement to prove even 
harmful intent. Yet the punishment for communications fraud may be 1-15 years in 
prison. 
4Mattinson has served 47 days in the Utah County Jail for the second degree felony 
of communications fraud in this case. The defendant in Norris served approximately 3 
years in prison and 270 days in jail for multiple counts of communications fraud arising 
out of two counties. 
3 
In summary, Sullivan does not stand for the proposition that all falsehoods made 
knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth are unprotected speech. Rather, 
Sullivan "designed a constitutional privilege intended to free criticism of public officials 
from the restraints imposed by the common law of defamation," Gertz v. Robert Welch 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1973). Norris is unaware of any precedent that applies the standard of 
Sullivan to a criminal statute restricting speech. Accordingly, Sullivan is limited to its civil 
context and has no bearing on the constitutionality of a criminal statute. 
C. BY ITS PLAIN TERMS, §76-10-1801 UNCONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROSCRIBES SPEECH WITHOUT REGARD FOR CONTENT OR 
PLACE OR WHETHER IT POSES A CLEAR AND PRESENT 
DANGER, AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO 
MATTINSON. 
The appropriate analysis of a criminal statute that regulates speech is set forth in 
Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), wherein Justice Holmes stated, "The 
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. . . . The 
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and 
degree." Id. at 52 (emphasis added). See also, Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 
507-508 (1951) (explaining when a criminal statute imposes a "direct restriction upon 
speech, a 'clear and present danger' that the substantive evil would be caused was 
necessary before the statute in question could be constitutionally applied."); Thomas v. 
4 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (U.S.) Ow[A]ny attempt to restrict [First Amendment] liberties must 
be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and 
present danger.55). The actual malice standard does not apply on these facts. 
Under the proximity and degree analysis in Schenck, a criminal statute that seeks 
to regulate certain speech, such as recklessly made falsehoods, may not proscribe all such 
speech without regard for its content or the place in which it is made. Smith v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 n 16 (1977) (explaining that a criminal statute may not proscribe 
all potentially dangerous speech, without taking into account content ("Fire!55) and place (a 
crowded theater) (citing and quoting Schenck)). The possibility that some unprotected 
speech may go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected speech may be 
muted. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 60. 
In other words, contrary to the sweeping language of §76-10-1801, the knowingly 
false statement, "When I am elected President, I will ensure quality health care for all 
Americans, and I will not raise taxes,5" may not subject the speaker to criminal sanctions 
unless and until the government can establish that a clear and present danger exists every 
time that statement is made and in every context in which it is made. See, Id. at 64-65 
("the line between permissible advocacy and impermissible incitation to crime or violence 
depends, not merely on the setting in which the speech occurs, but also on exactly what the 
speaker had to say.55). 
It is not disputed here that the legislature has a legitimate interest in preventing 
5 
and prosecuting fraud. However, statutes that implicate First Amendment freedoms must 
be "narrowly tailored" to achieve government interests. Riley v. Nat'I Fed'n of Blind, 487 
U.S. 781, 788 (1988) (finding fundraising ordinance targeting fraudulent schemes 
unconstitutionally overbroad, and that "government regulation of speech must be 
measured in minimums, not maximums." Id. at 790). Notwithstanding these First 
Amendment restrictions on efforts to regulate speech, §76-10-1801 casts such a large net 
for all possible offenders, regardless of intent or content or place of speech, that it is 
effectively "burning the house to roast the pig." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 822 (1997) 
(citation omitted) (holding statute seeking to regulate internet pornography 
unconstitutionally overbroad). Similarly, the communications fraud statute "threatens to 
torch" all persons who do or say anything remotely dishonest for even a harmless purpose 
of obtaining anything of value from another. Id. 
The communications fraud statute does not just proscribe speech that may pose a 
clear and present danger. It criminalizes all falsehoods made with at least a reckless 
disregard for the truth, even if they are not harmful. The fact that the statute may 
legitimately proscribe some criminal conduct is not sufficient to survive constitutional 
scrutiny. "The prospect of crime . . . by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected 
speech." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
The pertinent constitutional decisions in the context of criminal fraud statutes 
confirm that the Utah communications fraud statute is indeed unconstitutionally 
6 
overbroad, because under its plain terms, it makes a second degree felony of any 
intentional or recklessly uttered falsehood designed to obtain something of value from 
another, without requiring any intent to defraud, success in defrauding, or danger - either 
clear or present. To the contrary, it encompasses a wide array of communicative conduct 
which is not fraudulent.5 
Even as applied to the facts of this case, there was no "clear and present danger" 
that the statute deterred. Notwithstanding the state's arguments about how Mattinson's 
conduct might conceivably fit within the broad parameters of the statute, not even the state 
is making the absurd claim that if Wells and Mattinson had truthfully represented their 
identities, the hospital would have refused to treat Wells for life-threatening meningitis. 
No one can credibly argue that Wells obtained treatment because Mattinson pretended to 
be her husband. To the contrary, Mattinson could have dropped Wells off at the ER door, 
and she still would have obtained treatment, particularly if she was delirious. Moreover, 
whether Mattinson would even be held civilly liable for the cost of Wells' treatment is 
unlikely, but is in any event an issue more appropriately determined in a civil proceeding. 
See, People v. Moran, 632 NE.2d 1115, 1121 (111. App. 2nd Dist. 1994) ("Just as a debtor-
creditor relationship cannot be the basis for criminal liability, the criminal justice system 
cannot be allowed to be used as a collection agency for a civil litigant." Id. at 1121). 
5See, e.g., Provo City v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989) (recognizing First 
Amendment protection of private sexual speech and conduct between consenting adults). 
7 
Because Mattinson was not found on these facts to have defrauded the hospital of medical 
services, §76-10-1801 statute is also unconstitutional as applied to him. 
C. §76-10-1801 IS OVERBROAD AND VAGUE, PARTICULARLY AS 
APPLIED TO MATTINSON, BECAUSE IT HAS NO CORE OF 
EASILY IDENTIFIABLE CONSTITUTIONALLY 
PROSCRIBABLE CONDUCT. 
A statute is substantially overbroad if "there is no core of easily identifiable and 
constitutionally proscribable conduct that the statute prohibits." Secretary of Maryland v. 
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 965 (1984). A criminal statute that does not 
distinguish between constitutionally protected and constitutionally proscribable activities 
is overbroad and facially invalid. Id. at 966. This overbreadth problem also relates to a 
statute's vagueness. "The increased deterrent effect of a vague criminal provision, 
coupled with the risk of discriminatory enforcement, poses greater concerns with respect 
to the freedom of speech protected by the Federal Constitution's First Amendment than 
those implicated by a civil regulation." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
Because the statute at issue is written to proscribe both harmful and innocuous 
behavior, as evidenced by its terms, there is no core of easily identifiable constitutionally 
proscribable conduct. The harmless practical joke or the "white lie" is indistinguishable 
from the organized scheme to defraud. And the defendant who takes his critically ill 
friend to-the hospital and falsely represents himself to be her husband so he can stay with 
her, is prosecuted for the same offense as the organized scheme to defraud vulnerable 
senior citizens out of their retirement. Thus, there is no core of easily identifiable conduct 
8 
such that Martinson could have foreseen that he would be subject to prosecution for 
helping his friend. 
In Norris, this Court focused solely on mens rea, thereby omitting consideration 
of the question of overbreadth in the context of all the broad and vague statutory language, 
notwithstanding the incorrect application of Sullivan. Yet, the Utah communications fraud 
statute even deviates from its common law roots. It is patterned after the common law 
crime of false pretenses which has been codified in many states.6 However, Utah's 
6False pretenses is a form of theft by deception or larceny and is encompassed by 
statutes dealing with such crimes in other jurisdictions. What follows are just a few 
examples that are illustrative: 
Cal. Pen. Code §532, False Pretenses: Every person who knowingly and 
designedly, by a false or fraudulent representation or pretense, defrauds any other person 
of money, labor, or property, whether real or personal, or who causes or procures others 
to report falsely of his or her wealth or mercantile character, and by thus imposing upon 
any person obtains credit, and thereby fraudulently gets possession of money or property, 
or obtains the labor or service of another, is punishable in the same manner and to the 
same extent as for larceny of the money or property so obtained. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18-4-403 (false pretenses encompassed by theft and 
requires proof of intent to defraud of measurable monetary value or something that 
anyone other than the defendant has a possessory or proprietary interest in). 
See also, e.g., Conn. Gen Stat. Ann. §53a-l 19 ("A person obtains property by false 
pretenses when, by any false token, pretense, or device, he obtains from another any 
property, with intent to defraud him or any other person."); Del. Code Ann., Title 11, 
§843 (similar); D.C. Code §22-3221 ("A person commits the offense of fraud . . . if that 
person engages in a scheme or systematic course of conduct with intent to defraud or to 
obtain property of another by means of false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or 
promise and thereby obtains property of another or causes another to lose property (lesser 
offense in subsequent subsection if property not obtained)). 
9 
provision departs from the common law in ways that infringe upon First Amendment 
protections by creating a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, thereby again 
"burning the house to roast the pig." Reno v. ACLU, supra. 
Under the common law, the elements that generally must be proven to establish 
false pretenses are (1) a representation of a past event or existing fact that is untrue 
{UnitedStates v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987); (2) calculated to mislead (People v. 
Caruso, 345 P.2d 282 (Ca. 1960), cert den, 363 U.S. 819 (I960)); (3) intended to induce 
the person to whom it is made to part with something of value (People v. Jones, 224 P.2d 
353 (Ca. 1950)); and (4) the person to whom it is made relies upon the false representation 
and suffers injury by parting with the thing of value (Id.). 
A statute with substantive similarity to §76-10-1801 is Ariz. Stat. Ann. §13-2310, 
Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices:7 "Any person who, pursuant to a scheme or artifice to 
defraud, knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, promises or material omissions is guilty of a class 2 felony." Consistent 
with the law cited herein, even a cursory glance at this provision reveals that unlike the 
Utah statute, there is no criminal liability unless it can be proven that a defendant intended 
7The only other state to enact a statute explicitly dealing with the crime of 
"communications fraud" is the Florida Communications Fraud Act, Title 46, §817.034, 
which, unlike the Utah provision, is specifically aimed at schemes to defraud via various 
communications technology. Also unlike the Utah communications fraud provision, 
Florida's statute expressly defines "schemes to defraud," "property," and "value" and 
requires proof of an intent to defraud. The Florida provision also defines "communicate" 
much more narrowly than the Utah provision. 
10 
to defraud. Indeed, without exception, all jurisdictions except for Utah require proof of 
intent to defraud for comparable offenses. See, United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019 (1st 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Grissom, 
44 F.3d 1057, cert den, 131 L.Ed. 2d 579 (1995); United States v. Chandler, 98 F.3d 711 
(2nd Cir. 1996) (intent to harm essential element that must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt); People v. Stewart, 739 P.2d 854 (Colo. 1987); State v. Rochette, 594 A.2d 1006 
(Conn.App. 1991). 
Even under Utah's theft by deception statute, which is also based upon the 
common law crime of false pretenses, it is essential to prove fraudulent intent. State v. 
Fowler, 745 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1987). Not requiring an intent to defraud creates an 
inherent ambiguity in §76-10-1801 and thereby unconstitutionally widens the net in which 
unsuspecting offenders, such as Martinson, may be caught unawares. 
Because the Utah communications fraud statute has "no core of easily identifiable 
and constitutionally proscribable conduct," and thus risks the chilling of free speech, and 
because the goal of fraud prevention can easily be attained by far narrower means, this 
Court should strike the communications statute on overbreadth grounds. 
II. §76-10-1801 IMPLICATES CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
SPEECH AND IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS. 
The state's position that the statute at issue does not implicate the First 
Amendment is based upon an incorrect interpretation of the law. As shown above, §76-
10-1801 implicates First Amendment interests in that it seeks to regulate speech, period. 
11 
See, United States v. Jackson, 199 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that when 
a statute involves First Amendment freedoms, one may challenge the statute for vagueness 
even if the statute clearly applies to the challenger's conduct) (emphasis added); United 
States v. Pourhassen, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1189-1190 (10th Cir. 2001) (facial challenge 
to statute that threatened speech or conduct protected by the First Amendment was proper). 
Under the Supreme Court authority cited in the section above, there can be no 
serious dispute that the Utah communications fraud statute implicates First Amendment 
freedoms. See, i.e., Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S., supra, and its progeny. Therefore, 
Mattinson can challenge the statute on vagueness grounds regardless of whether the statute 
is "impermissibly vague in all of its applications," Norris, 2004 UT App 267, % 12 (citation 
omitted), and notwithstanding the fact that it is impermissibly vague as applied to him. 
"[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient defmiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice 
to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have recognized recently that the more 
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine is not actual notice, but the other 
principal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. Where the legislature fails to 
provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless 
sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal 
predilections. . . It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net 
large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step 
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. 
This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department 
of government." 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358 (citations and quotations omitted). 
12 
As has previously been argued, there are many ambiguities in the 
communications fraud statute. The fact that no harm or intent to harm is required creates 
inherent ambiguities relative to the statute's scope of application. The addition of the 
"anything "of value" language, the unlimited scope of the defined term "communicate," and 
the innocuous meaning of "artifice," opens the door to arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement as wide as a prosecutor's discretion allows. 
The ambiguities created by these terms extend the scope of the statute's reach 
well-beyond criminal culpability, and thereby render the statute "problematic for purposes 
of the First Amendment." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 870-871 (holding criminal statute 
regulating pornography void for vagueness given the "absence of a definition" for core 
terms such that a speaker may not confidently assume what activities were prohibited by 
the statute). 
While the communications fraud statute proscribes artifices "to defraud another," 
it also proscribes artifices to obtain something of value, which is a subjective and 
therefore, unconstitutionally vague term. LM.L. v. State, 2002 UT 110, at [^25 (citations 
omitted) ("[T]o avoid chilling the exercise of vital First Amendment rights, restriction of 
expression must be expressed in terms which clearly inform citizens of prohibited conduct 
and in terms susceptible of objective measurement."); See also, Graynedv. Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vagueness doctrine requires laws not only to give citizens notice 
of proscribed behavior, but also prevents those who are to enforce the laws from 
13 
.exercising what should be the legislative prerogative in discriminatory application of 
vague laws). 
While the Norris Court rejected his challenge to the "anything of value" language 
because the evidence supported a finding that he engaged in a scheme to defraud people of 
money, Norris, f 15, the information in this case alleged that Mattinson engaged in a 
scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain anything of value (R. 2). As noted in 
Martinson's opening brief, and contrary to the state's arguments and the record, the jury 
specifically requested instructions regarding the meaning of "anything of value," 
specifically as that phrase related to the obtaining of medical treatment rather than 
monetary value (R. 142); Brf. of Appt., ADDENDUM A. The state's arguments suggesting 
that Mattinson was convicted on the basis of intent to defraud the hospital are therefore 
disingenuous. Brf. of Appe. 16. 
A. EVEN THE STATE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE STATUTE. 
The state concedes that the "anything of value" language is "quite broad." Id. 
Moreover, the state concedes that the state advanced two separate theories in its 
prosecution of Mattinson to increase the odds of obtaining a conviction at trial. Id Such 
prosecutorial tactics defeat the state's own arguments that a "statute must define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement," and that Mattinson was not prevented from adequately preparing his 
14 
defense by the vague and broad application of the statute to this case. Id. at 13-14. 
The state's prosecutorial tactics set forth in the record and conceded by the state 
demonstrate that even the state did not know how to define "anything of value" and 
therefore, had to guess at its meaning. Notably, no one is arguing that the state's trial 
counsel was not a person of at least common intelligence. See, Provo City v. Thompson, 
44 P.3d 828, 834 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (adhering to the standard that a statute is void for 
vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning). 
To the contrary, during trial the state rightly assumed that value might be anything the jury 
might accept as such, even though it could not be objectively measured. 
In its brief, the state ignores the facts of this case, the record, and the plain 
language of §76-10-1801 in asserting that "[a] scheme to avoid detection by the authorities 
. . . does not fit the meaning of a 'scheme or artifice . . . to obtain from another . . . 
anything of value.'" Id. at 16. While it is arguable whether a person may be able to obtain 
anonymity from another, a person may certainly obtain peace of mind from another who is 
providing a loved one with necessary medical treatment. That the jury so found is 
consistent with the record (R. 142). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Richard Jeremy Martinson, 
respectfully requests this Court to vacate his convictions on the grounds that § 76-10-1801 
is unconstitutional in that it is both overly broad and void for vagueness. In the 
15 
alternative, Mattinson requests this Court to find the statute unconstitutional as applied to 
him. 
Respectfully submitted this *f"\ Lii-day of October, 2004. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
JennifedK. Gowans I / 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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